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THE LAW, CONFINEMENT,
AND
DISRUPTIVE EXCESS
IN
HAYS'S
THE VICTIM OF PREJUDICE
Sandra Sherman

n the hard-pressed 1790s, women's writing in England
depicted middle class women fallen on hard times 7 Yet
rather than subjecting such women to the legal conse
quences of poverty (e.g., imprisonment for debt), these
texts isolated women in Gothic dungeons or castles, in humiliating

' The 1790s suffered war, high taxes, financial crises (1793, 1797, 1799), inflation, bad harvests,
food riots, and strikes. "Savage cuts in living standards were not solely experienced by workers,
for they extended rapidly to the capitalist classes, and not just to minor representatives. For the
latter, war and famine pushed poor rates and taxes to unprecedented levels, and induced
economic recession too; economic imbalances and difficulties began to wreck some regional
economies." Roger Wells, Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England 1793-1801 (New York:
St. Martin's, 1988), 321. Bankruptcies more than doubled between 1791 and 1793, and 1793 saw
an unprecented number of bank failures. See Arthur Gayer, W.W. Rostow, AnnaSchwartz, The
Growth and Fluctuation of the British Economy 1790-1830 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953),
Chapter 1. On inflation and women's fiction, see Edward Copeland, Women Writing About
Money: Women's Fictionin England, 1790-1820(Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995),
Chapter 1.
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"service," or debasing penury.^ The patriarchal concomitants of a loss
of caste—exposure to sexual predation, a drift into prostitution, loss of
"character" and employment—were rendered as private experience,
distinct from social phenomena mediated by the law. In such texts, the
personal was apolitical, detached from normative practices that could
be critiqued. From the perspective of modern feminism, insistent that
women's personal experience is socially created (and hence a legitimate
subject for the law), this writing reflects feminist prehistory.' Yet in
this article, I argue that Mary Hays's The Victim of Prejudice (1799)
transcends its contemporaries, drawing startlingly modern connections
between patriarchal practices across a social/legal continuum. It
resonates with feminist jurisprudence, in which "the rule of law and the
rule of men are one thing, indivisible, at once official and unoffi
cial—officially circumscribed, unofficially not. State power, embodied
in law, exists throughout society as male power at the same time as the
power of men over women throughout society is organized as the
power of the state.'"* The Victim of Prejudice dramatizes such premises,
at a time when even support for "fallen" women fails to confront the
law's patriarchal bias.

' M.J. Daunton notes that "degradation involved personal identity and status, and was not simply
a matter of material loss." Progress and Poverty: An Economic and Social History of Britain
1799-18S0 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 421.
' "Feminist theory emphasizes thevalue of direct and personalexperience as the place that theory
should begin, as embodied in the phrase 'the personal is political.' This phrase reflects the view
that the realm of personal experience, the 'private' which has always been trivialized, is an
appropriate and imponant subject of public inquiry, and that the 'private' and 'public' worlds
are inextricably linked." Elizabeth Schneider, "The Dialeaics of Rights and Politics:Perspectives
from the Women's Movement," in Martha Fineman and Nancy Thomadsen, At the Boundaries
of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (New York: Routledge, 1991), 301-19. In the same volume,
see also Adrian Howe, "The Problem of Privatized Injuries: Feminist Strategies for Litigation,"
148-67. Howe cites Catharine MacKinnon's argument that while sexual harrassment is a
"personal" injury, "it is 'a social wrong and a social injury that occurs on a personal level'" (160).
She concludes that in order to insure that women's privatized reality is "not lost in its translation
into a legal claim, we need to demonstrate that the injuries we feel at the private, intimate level
are socially-created (indeed, social) injuries before we demand that they become pubhc issues. At
the same time, analytically privileging social injury in a feminist legal framework will provide
a necessary step in the deconstrurtion of the private/public dichotomy" (162).
•" Catharine MacKinnon, Towarda Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1989), 170. To the same effect see MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the
State: Toward Feminist Jurispmdence," Sigris 8 (1983): 635-58:"The state is male in the feminist
sense. The law sees and treats women the way mensee and treat women....Substantively, the way
the male point of view frames an experience is the way it is framed by state policy" (644).
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Mary Ann Radcliffe's The Female Advocate attacks male aggran
dizement of female professions, but imagines women's unemployment
as private grief, barely touching the law:
[A]fter, perhaps, a life of ease and affluence, to be compelleid
to such a mortifying situation [a "humiliating scene of
beggary"], requires more than a common share of fortitude to
support....She who, perhaps, a short time since, charmed her
acquaintance with her sprightly conversation and virtuous
example, by one adverse stroke, is nevertheless so soon
become the contempt, the scorn, and the outcast of mortals.^
For Radcliffe, the ramifications of female poverty are private, familial:
"the poor, dejected mother, as well as daughter, is condemned to share
the same direful miseries." Rather than causing women's miseries, the
double standard modulates into social obtuseness, a perceptual
dysfunction equating economic with moral decline. Radcliffe suggests
there is no recourse. Mother and daughter share a "low state of
wretchedness, from which their characters are stigmatized with infamy,
and to which they unavoidably fall a sacrifice" (30).^ Moreover, by
citing "infamy" as the outcome of economic fall, Radcliffe finesses its
legal consequences: imprisonment for debt, loss of credibility as a
witness or plaintiff, decreased chance of pardon for capital crime. Even
at her harshest, she imagines only an impoundment for vagrancy,
sounding more in gothic ("with the rattling of bolts and bars," "a

^ The Female Advocate (London, 1799), 29-30. In London in the Age of Industrialization:
Entrepreneurs, Labour Force and Living Conditions, 1700-18S0 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), L.D.Scwartz notes that "restriaions on female employment were one
of the major causes of the poverty and exploitation suffered by women....[T]he effort by skilled
workers to restrict the free flow of labour into their trade was sure to rebound principally
against women" (46). On men'sorganized effonsto eliminate women from the labor market and
to depress their wages, see Anna Clark, The Struggle for the Breeches: Gender and the Making of
the British Working Class (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 119-40.
' Like Radcliffe, Mary Wollstonecraft depicts a fall into poverty as seen through the eyes of
others: "as women educated like gentlewomen, are never designed for the humiliating situation
which necessity sometimes forces them to fill; these situations are considered in the light of a
degradation; and they know little of the human heart, who need to be told, that nothing so
painfully sharpens sensibility as such a fall in life." See A Vindication of the Rights of Women
[1792], ed. Miriam Brody (London: Penguin, 1992), 267.
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wretched exile in this miserable dungeon"), than in a legal system where
theft was punishable by death (36-37.)^
The Female Advocate adopts the gothic turn of women's economic
paranoia, evading the legal realities of women's impoverishment.
Edward Copeland notes that middle-class fiction of the 1790s used
gothic conventions to convey women's fear of falling, since "economic
life and gothic imagery seemed not an odd combination, but closely
related indeed."^ Both exacted a type of confinement, so that gothic
functioned as metaphor, signifying collapse of economic possibility
while collapsing the possibility of real "gaol." It was ominous and
anodyne. Readers knew "just what a gothic castle meant and what sort
of economic treacheries would be likely to lead the heroine into one"
(46). "The journey" entailed "toy castles with real locks" (46-7).
The "toy castle" aspect of women's fiction is dismissed in Mary
Wollstonecraft's The Wrongs of Woman, where the heroine, whose
husband kidnaps her to a madhouse so he can seize her money, reflects
on the institutional reality of sequestration:
Abodes of horror have frequently been described, and
castles, filled with spectres and chimeras, conjured up by the
magic spell of genius to harrow the soul, and absorb the
wondering mind. But, formed of such stuff as dreams are
made of, what were they to the mansion of despair, in one
corner of which Maria sat, endeavoring to recal [sic] her
scattered thoughts! (75).
Yet The Wrongs of Woman does not explore the illegal incidents of
Maria's confinement. Rather, it resorts to the Gothic of sister novels.

' Under the Vagrancy Act, a person lacking means of support could be held in a "house of
correaion" for a short period. But poverty increased the disposition towards crime, and the
number of capital crimes (almost all dealing with property) rose over the century from about
50 to more than 200 between 1688 and 1820. See Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority, and the
Criminal Law," in Douglas Hay et al., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in EighteenthCentury England (New York: Pantheon, 1975), 17-63. In "The Criminality of Women in
Eighteenth-Century Englsnd," Journal of Social History 8 (1975): 80-116, J.M. Beattie observes
that in Surrey for the years 1663-1802, women were charged with almost 24 percent of the
property offences. Almost six out of ten women who appeared in court for serious crimes were
there on that basis (see Table 1). Beattie notes that theft and related crimes brought women into
trouble with the law even more than men (89).
' Women Writing About Money, 41. '

Law, Confinement, Excess

135

crediting their "fictitious" content with "phantoms" that plague Maria's
mind and (so she asserts) constitute reality:
[Maria] descanted on "the ills which flesh is heir to,"
with bitterness, when the recollection of her babe was
revived by a tale of fictitious woe, that bore any resemblance
to her own; and her imagination was continually employed,
to conjure up and embody the various phantoms of misery,
which folly and vice had let loose on the world. (80)
However real Maria's madhouse, it "conjures" a metaphoric environ
ment signifying the horror of economic fall, while ignoring laws whose
biases compel the logic, indeed the ideology of the text. Except for the
story of Maria's keeper, Jemima, formerly conunitted to a workhouse.
The Wrongs of Woman portrays confinement as the mental correlative
of "fictitious woe," remote from legal mediation.' Maria is paralyzed by
texts with "any resemblance" to her life, projecting novels into
epitomes of the human condition ("the ills which flesh is heir to")
which she blames for her plight.
Eleanor Ty suggests that in Wollstonecraft's Gothic, "figures of
the subconscious imagination" allow her to "project and literalize her
worst anxieties about patriarchy and the abuse of authority.'"® Yet as
Copeland observes, Gothic is non-literal, confining discourse as if it
were a stricken female. Had The Wrongs of Woman put gothic aside,
depicting the incidents of false imprisonment and a failed remediation,
law itself would have been cast as a convention, the public aspect of
private "abuse." Maria's plight would have evinced systemic abuse,
instantiated in a cognizable public wrong. A failed redress—for lack of
funds, judicial animus—would have rendered Maria's confinement
discursively potent, evincing the legal disabilities of "fallen" women."
' On "metaphysical" imprisonment behind mental walls, see W.B. Carnochan, Confinement and
Flight: An Essay on English Literature of the Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1977). Maria might have read contemporary textsdepicting unlawful madhouse
confinement: Thomas Holcroft's /Inna St. Ives (London, 1792), Mary Robinson's Walsingham
(1797), and George Walker's Theodore Cyphon (London, 1796).
Unsex'd Revolutionaries: Five Women Novelists of the 1790s (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1993), 34.
" Maria might have deduced a failed outcome from popular legal manuals, which made law
available to laypersons but identified the legal system with men. See, for example. The
Gentleman, Merchant, Tradesman, Lawyer, and Debtor's Pocket Guide, In Cases of Arrest, by an
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Withdrawn from such polemic, Wollstonecraft enlarges the
metaphoricity of Maria's confinement: "Was not the world a vast
prison, and women born slaves?" (79). Though powerful rhetoric, such
elevation of gender politics above the mundane typifies the aversion of
late eighteenth-century women's fiction to the legal consequences of
women's loss of caste.'^ Even where this fiction engages the mundane,
submerging a woman in debt, forcing her to work, women are never
submitted to debtor's prison except in The Victim of Prejudice. While
prostitution is acknowledged, women never commit crimes punished
by death except in The Victim of Prejudice. If they are "ruined," no
brutal rapists laugh at prosecution except in The Victim of Prejudice.
Though male-authored tracts demanded prison reform, and protested
imprisonment for debt of the paterfamilias, women's fiction failed to
transpose such demands to a female register, even though women too
populated jails. Women's fiction failed to tap the energy of such
discourse, to assert in realistic terms law's gendered inequity."

"Eminent Barrister at Law" (London, 1785), and Thomas Wooler, Every Man His Own Attorney
(London, 1800), which contains a section on false imprisonment. On the nature of the tort, see
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford, 1768):"every confinement
of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house....
Unlawful or false imprisonment consists in such confinement without authority. ..." (3:127).
As a remedy, "the party shall recover damages for the injury he has received; and also the
defendant is...liable to pay a fine to the king for the violation of the public peace" (3:138).
The Wrongs of Women cites legal bias on several points, for example as regards Maria's
incapacity to separate from her husband. However, it does not pursue the law's address to her
confinement once Maria loses control of her money.
" In Eliza Parsons's The History of Miss Meredith (1790), and Jane Timbury's The Philanthropic
Rambler (1790), widows take in needlework, wash clothes, and are severely pinched. Clara
Reeve's Schoolfor Widows (1791), depicts a Mrs. Darnford, who refuses the settlement of a farm
in return for illicit companionship. In Charlotte Smith's Marchmont (1796), three sisters share
the necessity of going into trade, but are quickly reprieved by unexpected funds. In Parsons' The
Voluntary Exile (1795), the once financially secure Eliza suffers a series of calamities, loses her
husband, and survives in relative penury. In her The Mysterious Warning (1796), the formerly
prosperous Louisa is saved from an apparent death-wish when a school friend fortuitously
arrives. Anna Maria Bennett's The Beggar Girl and Her Benefactors (1797), subjects the formerly
genteel Rosa to the trials of governessing.Mary Robinson's The Natural Daughter (1799), depicts
an abandoned wife forced to take up acting until her husband returns, as well as another
respectable woman who tries and fails to be an author.
" The number of women imprisoned for debt was small relative to men, since married women
were not responsible for their own debts. But single women were. In "The Criminality of
Women in the Eighteenth Century," Beattie notes that "the conditions of life bore hard on single
women," leading inevitably to crime (101).In Prison Reform in Lancashire, 1700-18S0 (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1986), Margaret DeLacy notes that jails "contained female prisoners,
whose numbers rose considerably toward the end of the eighteenth century" (29). During the
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Perhaps because of such genteel silence, The Victim of Prejudice is
visceral, enraged, literally coming to blows with women's le
gal/economic disability. In this text, the "miseries" Radcliffe complains
of harden into cell walls. Unlike its sister texts. The Victim of Prejudice
confronts women's imprisonment, rape, and legal disempowerment,
and attempts to "feminize" efforts to reform the legal system. Though
it has been called "dramatic—and sometimes melodramatic,"^' and
though it deploys some gothic conventions, its address to women's
confinement invokes such reforming tracts as John Mason Good's A
Dissertation on the Diseases of Prisons and Poor-Houses (1795), John
Howard's The State of the Prisons in England and Wales (3rd. ed., 1784),
and Thomas Macdonald's A Treatise on Civil Imprisonment in England,
With the History of its Progress and Objections to its Policy (1791). With
chilling irony, it invokes the stereotype of the poor in Patrick
Colquhoun'sy4 Treatise on the Police ofthe Metropolis (1795), "who from
their own mismanagement and want of industry...are suddenly broke
down" (317). For Hays, women "suddenly broke[n] down" do not
"want... industry"; their ability to work is held hostage to their sexual
complaisance, so that any remaining dignity drives them further
towards poverty and even crime. Hays arrives at the same position as
The Wrongs of Women—genAet imprisons—but literalizes the legal
incidents of women's economic fall. The text seizes phenomena that are
inchoate in other texts, giving their brutality shape.
*
The Victim of Prejudice is ostensibly the memoir of a dying author,
Mary. Issuing from behind "the gloomy walls of a prison," it appeals to
God "from the injustice and barbarity of society" (5). It contemplates
no mortal audience except a "successor to the present inhabitant," who
may find it "when the hand that wrote [it] moulders in the dust." The
idiom is claustrophobic, the governing trope a prison, defined as a
succession of exiles bound through recursive imagining. The writer begs

period 1783-87, over half the women condemned to death in Surrey were executed, rather than
receiving some sort of reprieve. See Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 584.
See Eleanor Ty's introduction to Hays, The Victim of Prejudice (Peterborough: Broadview
Press, 1994), xiv.
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her reader to "spare from the contemplation of thy own misery one
hour, and devote it to the memory of a fellow-sufferer" (3). Yet her
relation to this "fellow-sufferer" is not just that inscribed by generations
in a prison. Mary is her mother's "successor." Her imprisonment is an
entail, adumbrated in the text her mother left as she waited to be
hanged, worrying Mary's fate. In The Victim of Prejudice, prison is not
just a metaphor for gender; it is a phenomenon, gendered as mother and
daughter pass through it. In this regard, the text confronts the sublima
tions of women's fiction, asserting prison as real, a site of textual
production, rather than the mental correlative of "fictitious woe."
As a child, Mary is as an orphan unaware of her mother's past,
living in the country with her guardian, Mr. Raymond. To prop up his
narrow means, Raymond agrees to educate two haute bourgeois boys,
whose father insists he preserve them from "any improper acquain
tance, or humiliating connections, which might tend to interfere
with...their future dignity and advancement" (8). As the children grow,
the eldest son, William, forms an attachment to Mary. In their early
teens, sexuality is expressed in heroics. On a warm day, Mary accepts
William's challenge to enter the greenhouse of Sir Peter Osborne, the
lord of the manor, and steal a bunch of grapes. Thus while William
must be kept from "improper acquaintance," he is himself accessory to
a crime: stealing fruit was a capital offense.'^ However, setting the
pattern for the text, Mary's transgression is penalized.
Caught by Sir Peter, she is subjected to a type of droit de seigneur.
He usurps the sexual transaction reified in the theft, demanding "I must
and will have a kiss; and, d—n me! you shall be welcome to all the
grapes in the green-house" (14). The law of the polity, by which Mary
could be hanged, is refracted through that of patriarchy, whose option
it is to insult instead of prosecute. Mary is refused any choice. Sir Peter
"will have" her person. She escapes without forfeiting a kiss, but the
incident exhibits the gendering of justice: punishment for crime is
valenced to its perpetrator's sex, complicated by class affiliation. A
crime of passion (which by analogy, Mary's is), ceases to be mitigable
where the perpetrator is weak (and moreover the victim's "interest"
includes male eroticism as well as property rights). Mary's encounter

" In "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law," Hay notes that "in cases involving grain,
wood, trees, garden produce, fruit...,summary proceedings usually yielded a speedy and simple
conviction." "[A]ll of these offences were punished by death" (59).
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with Osborne is of a piece with her later encounters with law, and
those of her mother before her. But Mary counts herself triumphant.
Questioned by Raymond on her bruises, her agitation, the meaning of
the grapes, she declares:
They came, sir...from the greenhouse of Sir Peter
Osborne: I give them to William, because — / love him. (15)
To Mary, passage of the grapes to William untainted by compliance
with Sir Peter's regime, signifies refusal of that regime. Sir Peter refuses
her refusal.
When William and Mary are again about the estate, they see a hare
"panting, breathless, and limping"—sport for Sir Peter and his friends.
The two try to protect the animal, but Sir Peter becomes furious,
brandishing his whip at William while Mary, "rushing between
them...received several strokes" (21). His act is a legally cognizable
assault, but without trepidation he aggravates his insult to Mary,
claiming again a sexual droit:
"May I be d-mned if this is not the little thief that stole
the grapes from the green-house? By G-d! my pretty dear!
you shall not escape me now; but shall pay the full forfeit of
all your trespasses."
Saying which, he seized me, and, clasping me in his
arms, kissed me with an odious violence. (22)
Mary's incursion into the greenhouse is entrained in a parallel system
of justice—Sir Peter's whim—sanctioned by what is likely his command
of judicial machinery. As lord of the manor. Sir Peter is probably
Justice of the Peace in the county, charged with apprehending,
interrogating, and in some cases punishing felons.'^ Raymond, his
straitened tenant, could not expect Sir Peter to apprehend himself, and
lacks resources and influence to procure Sir Peter's recall. Should he

" In A History of English Law, 16 vols. (Boston; Little Brown, 1922-72), William Holdsworth
notes; "in the eighteenth century the method of appointment [of J. P.s] combined with the
permanence of the office to produce a great deal of class exclusiveness." 1;291. On J. P.s'
authority to apprehend, interrogate, and punish, see l;294-7. Assaults were within their
jurisdiction. See 4;138.
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seek to have Sir Peter called before the assize (i.e. circuit) court, his
tenancy would be become unendurable. Nor would Sir Peter'ssporting
friends likely testify against him. Justice for Mary is thus preempted by
the system of property/power relations among men.'® The same
relations exist between William's father and Raymond, who under
stands that Mary is an "improper acquaintance." Sir Peter exerts power
within a hierarchy that consumes Mary's eroticism, ordering both her
sexual complaisance and sexual restraint.
The involvement of law with patriarchal politics informs the
idiom of the text, valencing the idiom of confinement. As William and
Mary grow demonstrably fonder, the social inhibitions to their
romance impel Raymond to quash it. In a tense scene, he declares:
Were it not for certain prejudices, which the world has
agreed to respect and to observe, I should perceive your
growing tenderness with delight...But I am responsible to
another tribunal than that of reason and my own heart for
the sentiments and conduct of this young man, and I dare not
betray my trust. (31)
The "tribunal" that governs Raymond is not subject to "reason." It
enforces class "prejudices," preserving a patriarchal order to which sons
of rich men are beholden. Raymond is proxy to William's father in this
order, executing his wishes, barring Mary from pursuing her own
inclination. "Tribtmal," in this context, is metaphoric, but not just
metaphoric. It corresponds to and is continuous with the legal obstacles
presented by Sir Peter, as well as the system of justice "prejudiced"
against economically "fallen" women (Mary and her mother). Hays's
object is to rationalize what follows, narrowing the distance between
metaphor and reality, demonstrating that those who enforce law—sit
ting on real "tribunals"—draw precepts from pervasive social "laws"
that corrode the disinterest of legal institutions.

Class was a major determinant in prosecutions for assault. In "The Pattern of Crime in
England 1660-1800," Past and Present 62 (1974): 47-95, J. M. Beattie observes that "the viaims
of such mistreatment [assault] were hardly in a position to prosecute or even complain and cases
of this kind only rarely got into the courts. Victims who were, on the other hand, associated
with 'authority' were very likely to prosecute...." (62).
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Whereas before, Mary refused to relinquish her erotic instincts,
she now does so, though not without a struggle as fierce as that she
opposed to Sir Peter:
What tyranny is this? When reason, virtue, nature,
sanctify its emotions, why should the heart be controlled?
who dare control it?...For the first time in my life, I was
ready to accuse my guardian of injustice and caprice. It was
many hours ere I reasoned myself into more composure. (35)
Only by wilfully imposing "reason" where Raymond had denied its
application, can Mary instate some basis for the "control" he asserts.
Her reason is tinctured with nostalgia. She submits to the "tribunal"
Raymond serves because she disallows the possible precedent that he
might disserve her; her will directs her reason, effacing apparent
"injustice and caprice." She is still ambivalent; acquiescing in the
"tribunal's" jurisdiction, she questions apparent "injustice." Yet her
acquiescence—her adoption of the legal idiom—signifies patriarchy's
encompassing, extra-rational hold on emotion. Mary submits because
she rationalizes authority as "affection." Troubled but determined, she
states: "I confide, without shrinking, in your judgment and affection"
(37). As judge of an irrational tribunal, Raymond accepts her "shrink
ing" from her own "judgment," allowing her to identify with his.''
Accordingly, Mary first experiences sequestration, joining the
family of a rural curate, Mr. Neville. But her environs are not without
menace. Shortly after she arrives, she is saved from freakish drowning
by...Sir Peter! Mary repulses his advances, but in ensuing weeks he
continues to pester her. Finally, Neville insists he stay away. While Sir
Peter reluctantly complies, "on quitting the house, the insolent man of
fashion menaced my host, in obscure terms, with future retribution."
Unlike Raymond, Neville refuses tosupport an erotic regime mediated
by class, and so Sir Peter again invokes his droit, awakening "tender
fears...in the breast of Mrs. Neville" for her husband (51). While Sir

" Mary's compliance typifies late eighteenth-century disciplinary regimes; fathers no longer
controlled daughters by intimidation, educating theminstead to be "self-regulating, self-policing"
agents of the paternal will. See Caroline Gonda, Reading Daughters' Fictions 1709-1834: Novels
and Society from Manley to Edgeworth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 32. The
power of the patriarchal regime is evinced in Mary's attempt to rehabilitate it.
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Peter temporarily withdraws, William appears, offering marriage. Mary
demurs, but Raymond knows William will be back. Determined to
break up the romance, Raymond sends a narrative proving "the perils
of your situation"—the story of Mary's mother (57). It evinces
implacable "prejudice."
As he tells it, Raymond once loved a pampered young woman
who refused him for a rival. As time passed, he watched her become
"restless and disquieted...her health appeared daily to decline" (58-59).
Though he pursued a "determination of serving her," she was cold, and
ultimately he left the country. Five years later, after his return, he
passed "a tavern of doubtful reputation, with a tumultuous noise, in
which, amidst shouts and imprecations, the shrieks of women and the
cries of murder, mingled with the clashing of swords, might plainly be
distinguished." There had been a fatal duel. Fainting to one side was "a
woman, with a wan and haggard countenance, her clothes rent and her
hair dishevelled" (59). The duel had been for her favors, and now she
was accused of "holding, while his antagonist stabbed him, the arm" of
the victim. As Raymond stared, beset by a "confused recollection," the
woman started with "convulsive energy," pronounced his name, and
fell in a fit at his feet (60). The room was cleared.
The next day, "in a state of inconceivable anguish," Raymond
repaired to the jail where the woman was now incarcerated, an
accomplice to murder, "the wretched victim of sensuality and vice"
(61). Bribing the jailer, he is handed a letter from the woman, now
inscribed in the narrative that Mary reads. Of course, it is signed by
Raymond's old flame, "Mary," and expresses a wish to die. It pleads
with him ("the man whose invaluable heart I once contemned") not to
visit, but promises that a "history of [my] disgrace" and a "dying
request" will follow (61-62). By involving Mary—the second Mary—in
this "history," Raymond attempts to ratify his sensitivity to the
precarious status of female virtue, hence further endorsing his argument
that romance with a rich young man "[im]perils" Mary's "situation."
However, beyond its sordid self-dramatics, the "history" indicts the
"prejudice" that Raymond serves by tracing it into the legal system.
The indictment is proleptic.
Raymond's narrative states that on receipt of this first note he
"waited, in dreadful suspense, the issue of these cruel transactions."
After some weeks, the trial drew near:
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I strained every nerve, I left no effort untried, to soften
the evidence of her guilt, to avert or to mitigate her sentence.
My endeavors were fruitless: condemnation was pro
nounced.... (62)
Raymond seeks to have Mary pardoned. As Douglas Hay points out:
"Pardons were very common. Roughly half of those condemned to
death during the eighteenth century did not go to the gallows, but were
transported to the colonies or were imprisoned."^® What then is implied
by Raymond's failure? "Prejudice." The text retrieves into discourse the
matrix of assumptions underlying refusal of mercy. It casts the refusal
as a foregone conclusion having little to do with what Mary "did," and
much to do with her moral/economic marginality. As Hay notes, in
= capital cases "character witnesses were...extremely important." If a jury
convicted, "favorable testimony might still induce the judge to pass a
lesser sentence, or recommend a pardon" (42). Likewise, J. M. Beattie
observes that "The character of the capital laws encouraged the courts
to pay attention to the identity of the prisoner....The character of the
prisoner (in the sense of both his disposition and his reputation) was
especially important information and was often crucial to the outcome
of the trial" (439).
Mary's "character" would have "prejudiced" any court. In the
contemporary literature of crime, the female found in taverns was
singled out as not only dissolute, but a threat to the morals of men.
Patrick Golquhoun, the preeminent authority on crime, noted that
"the period is not even too remote to be recollected, since it was
considered as disgraceful for Females who pretended to any degree of
modesty to be seen in a Public-house."®' Speaking of young men,
Golquhoun observes that "having arrived at the age of puberty, and
meeting profligate female in those haunts of idleness, his passions
become inflamed.—The force of evil example overpowers him" (315).
He concludes:

" Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law," 43. On the commutation of death
sentences through royal prerogative, see also Leon Radzinowicz, A History of the Criminal Law
and its Administration from 1750 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), Vol.1, 107-37, J. M. Beattie,
Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800, 430-49, and V. A. C. Gatrell, The Hanging Tree:
Execution and the English People 1770-1868 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
"A Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis [1795],7th ed. (London, 1806),314.
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A disorderly and ill-regulated Public-house, therefore, is
one of the greatest nuisances that can exist in civil Society....
In fact, there is scarce any moral evil by which Society is
ajflicted—the mind debauched—the virtuous parent and Master
distressed, and the ruin of families and individuals effected,
which is not generated in Public-houses. (324-25)

Who would have testified in Mary's favor? Moreover, the brawl results
from "brutal and licentious contention for [Mary's] favors" (60); she is
promiscuously available, a prostitute. Colquhoim excoriates prostitutes.
Listing the causes of crime, he cites "the state and condition of the
unhappy Females, who support themselves by Prostitution....[I]t is
from the multitudes of those unhappy Females...that the morals of the
youth are corrupted" (325). Even Mary Anne Radcliffe exclaims:
What numbers of unguarded young men, even with
hearts inclined to virtue, have unhappily been drawn on to
vice, by the powerful insinuations of these poor abandoned
females, who, like Eve in Paradise, is [sic] no sooner fallen
herself, than, by deceitful artifice, she spreads the net of
destruction to catch others.^^
As a "type"—a denizen of the urban underworld, a progenitor of
crime—Mary is demonized before she is criminalized. Radcliffe's
language alluding to the "fall" is a commonplace, conflating economic
weakness and pernicious corruption. It reinscribes androcentric
discourse blaming women for men's vice." It testifies to the hegemony
of such discourse, preempting narratives that might dismiss prostitution
as corrupting to males, holding people responsible for their own fall
(and even for that of "weaker" individuals).

Radcliffe, The Female Advocate, 42-43.
" Markman Ellis notes that "the demi-monde of prostitution in libertine literature is
chararterized as depraved and outside domestic society: a criminal underworld inhabited not
only by prostitutes but all sorts of nefarious criminals." The Politics of Sensibility: Race, Gender,
and Commerce in the Sentimental Novel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162.
In Women, Writing, and Revolution, 1790-1827 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), Gary Kelly
examines the "fallen woman" theme in The Victim of Prejudice against revolutionary discourse,
noting that in the 1790s prostitution was "a figure for seduction of middle-class woman by
glamorous upper-class culture" (116).
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Mary's pardon also fails because "pardons favoured those with
connections," "mercy was part of the currency of patronage."^'* A
petition from Raymond would have meant little. "Petitions were most
effective from great men, and the common course was for a plea to be
passed up through increasingly higher levels of the social scale, between
men bound together by the links of patronage and obligation....Often
a long chain of interest and connection had to rattle before the judges
and the king listened" (45-46). Mary, like her daughter, is "prejudiced"
by norms implicating the economically marginal, as well as by the
system of relations among men favoring those with property. Ray
mond's failed petition—obviously involved in a matrix of gender and
class—serves to demystify pardon-dealing, which as Hay points out,
"went on at the highest levels only, well concealed from the eyes of the
poor" (47).
Moreover, Mary is sentenced for murder, not manslaughter. In the
eighteenth century, the indictment in a homicide always alleged
murder; it was left to the defendant to provide evidence allowing
conviction for the lesser offense.^^ Beattie explains that "the question of
intention was at the root of the distinction between murder and
manslaughter, between one that was planned and deliberate and one
that had resulted from a spontaneous outburst."^^ He notes that "in
tavern brawls men often made a point of saying they acted spontane
ously" (94)—it could be argued that unlike fights at work, for example,
tavern fights occured amongstrangers, suddenly inflamed by drink. But
Mary is the object of a fight; choosing sides could itself have required
deliberation. She is caught between men in a no-win position, unless
she refrains altogether. Her conviction is an emblem of her social
position: she is viewed as a predator while servicing men.
The day after Mary is hanged, Raymond receives the promised
"history." It describes infatuation and subsequent abandonment; she is
"thrown friendless and destitute upon the world, branded with
infamy...a wretched outcast from social life" (63). Moreover, she is
pregnant. She applies to her undoer for "justice and mercy," but he
demurs, anticipating "justice" to come (64). Another man pretends to

" Hay, "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law," 45.
" See J. M. Beattie, Crime ^nd the Courts in England 1660-1800, 80. For a contemporary
statement of the law, see Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4:201.
Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800, 91.
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befriend her, but he too is false. She awakes to the reality of her
condition. In words resonating with those of Millwood, that most
famous eighteenth-century "fallen woman," Mary wrests the psychol
ogy of prostitution from its androcentric commentators (notably
Colquhoun), who never fathom the rage towards men which becomes
its driving force:
I perceived myself the victim of injustice, of the preju
dice, of society, which, by opposing my return to virtue
almost insuperable barriers, had plunged me into irremedia
ble ruin. I grew sullen, desperate, hardened. I felt a malignant
joy in retaliating upon mankind a part of the evils which I
sustained. My mind became fiend-like, revelling in destruc
tion, glorying in shame....The injuries and insults to which
my odious profession exposed me eradicated from my heart
every remaining human feeling. I became a monster...and
contaminated alike, with a deadly poison, the health and the
principles of those unfortunate victims whom, with practiced
allurements, I entangled in my snares. (66-67)^^
Murder seems anticlimactic.
Mary's confession, brutal and brutally frank, is an assault on
silence, an intervention into androcentric literature of crime which
elides the genesis of prostitutes' revenge. Colquhoun reduces prostitu
tion to economics, missing its psychological substrate: "Abandoned by
their relations and friends; deserted by their seducers, and at large upon
the world; loathed and avoided by those who formerly held them in
estimation, what are they to do?" (334-35).^® His text—the normative

Millwood is the vengeful prostitute who deliberately corrupts innocent Barnwell in George
Lillo's immensely popular play, The London Merchant (1737). The plot became proverbial.
Even reformers such as Joseph Massie linked prostitution primarily to the debate on poverty
and the poor laws. See his Plan for the Establishment of Charity Houses for Exposed or Deserted
Women and Girls, andfor Penitent Prostitutes (London, 1784). Mary's account, implicating the
legal system in her fall, confutes not only establishment but also popular interpreters of crime.
If (as is probable) she is committed to Newgate, she would have been approached by its
Ordinary, who produced accounts in which the condemned confessed guilt, legitimating the
court's proceedings. He was often charged with "manipulatfing] the position to extract
confessions and 'lives' from prisoners" which were later sold. See Peter Linebaugh, "The
Ordinary of Newgate and His Account," in J.S. Cockburn, ed.. Crime in England 15i0-l800
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 246-69.
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text—offers a reading of the prostitute within a universal problematic:
making ends meet. It erases female experience, the humilation of being
"irredeemable." Mary's text refuses the universal, restoringthe specific,
complex female animus. It pursues a feminist project described by
Catharine MacKinnon: "to uncover and claim as valid the experience
of women, the major content of which is the devalidation of women's
experience."" It exposes the normative text as self-indulgent, as
finessing complicity in the crime it deplores.Mary's confession
develops a logic whereby she is guilty in one register, but justified in
another.
It renders the irony of Mary's impending death, as the act of
confessing ("my thoughts...methodized" [68]) becomes the occasion for
returning strength, a discovery of subjectivity and personal voice which
the law withholds from society:
I await my destiny; but feel, in the moment that life is
cut short, dispositions springing and powers expanding, that,
permitted to unfold themselves, might yet make reparation
to the society I have injured....But it is too late! Law com
pletes the triumph of injustice. (68)
For Mary, Law makes no space for "fallen" women: their narratives are
suppressed, subsumed into a standard plot whose conclusion is
foregone. Mary's confession, reconstituting her potency, decrying the
law's indifference, setting the record "straight," asserts her personal

"Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State," 638. In "The Problem of Privatized Injuries,"
Adrian Howe notes that feminist jurisprudence "takes as its starting point women's different
perspective on the wrongs we experience," offering "new solutions" to injuries resulting from
"sexist stereotypes" (154).
Compare Susan Glaspell's A Jury of Her Peers, which depias men's failure to perceive
"systematic, institutionalized, and culturally approved violence towards women" that stokes
women's potential for "retaliatory violence." Judith Fetterley, "Reading About Reading," in
Elizabeth Flynn and Patrocinio Schweickart, Gender and Reading: Essays on Readers, Texts, and
Contexts (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 147-64.
" On the "double aspett" of confession—a guilty admission, a prayer for forgiveness—see Peter
Brooks, "Storytelling Without Fear? Confession in Law and Literature," in Peter Brooks and
Paul Gewirtz, Law's Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1996), 114-35. Mary's quahfied confession would not appear in conventional gothic,
where "the imprisoned woman...is presented not as a rebel, but almost wholly as a viaim." See
TaniaModleski,LoMngTO'£f!<i Vengeance:Mass-Produced Fantasies for Women (Hamden: Archon
Books, 1982), 72.
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perspective, which is parallel but opposed to legal discourse. The effort
enacts the recuperative program of latter-day radical feminism,
articulated by Luce Irigaray:
[T]o speak of or about woman may always boil down to,
or be understood as, a recuperation of the feminine within a
logic that maintains it in repression, censorship, nonrecognition.
In other words, the issue is not one of elaborating a new
theory of which woman would be the subject or the object,
but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspend
ing its pretension to the production of a truth and of a
meaning that are excessively imivocal.^^
Mary "arrests" the law's univocality, stopping and reversing it. She
exposes the self-congratulatory aspect of the system of pardons, of the
Ordinary's publication of repentant murderers' lives, and of texts
speaking to the causes of female crime. Irigaray argues that with respect
to discourse in which woman is "defined as lack, deficiency, or as
imitation and negative image of the subject," the required response is "a
disruptive excess on the feminine side" (78). This is Mary's tactic:
The despotism of man rendered me weak, his vices
betrayed me into shame, a barbarous policy stifled returning
dignity, prejudice robbed me of the means of independence,
gratitude ensnared me in the devices of treachery, the
contagion of example corrupted my heart, despair hardened
and brutality rendered it cruel.
A sanguinary policy precludes reformation, defeating the
dear-bought lessons of experience, and by a legal process.

See Irigaray, The Sex Which is Not One (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 78. Julia
Kristeva observes: "What I mean by 'woman,' is that which is not represented, that which is
unspoken, that which is left out of namings and ideologies." See "Interview," Claire Pajaczkowska, m/fb/h (1981), cited in Patricia Yaeger, Honey-Mad Women: Emancipatory Strategies in
Women's Writing (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), 84. See also the Introduction
to Fathers and Daughters, Lynda Boose and Betty Flowers, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins,
1989), 1-14, noting that "attempting to 'read' absence, to illuminate what is not included in the
cultural text, becomes a crucial way of understanding what the culture has mapped by its very
attempts to circumnavigate" (2).
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assuming the arm of omnipotence, annihilates the being
whom its negligence left destitute, and its institutions
compelled to offend. (68-69)
Mary's outburst, tying together in a single noose the mores and the
laws of patriarchy, is (in Ty's words) "melodramatic." But it is also
calculated, a "disruptive excess." Her object is to sunder a monolith, the
social and legal complacencies—"prejudice" and "injustice"—responsible
for her condition. The irony is that her words are directed at Raymond,
already coopted by patriarchalism, rather than at an audience that could
(let alone would) effectuate change." Thus while Hays exposes
perceptions suppressed in androcentric discourse, she infers that such
exposure is futile.
In the last paragraph of her letter, Mary commends to Raymond
her infant daughter—the second Mary. She hopes he will "inspire her
with fortitude," "teach her to contemn the tyranny that would impose
fetters of sex upon her mind" (69). Crucially, epitomizing the ideology
of The Victim of Prejudice, Raymond calibrates this cautionary mission
with his mission as subaltern to William's father. He conscripts the text
into endorsing hereditary fall, naturalizing the gendered "tyranny" he
was asked to oppose. Glossing her mother's narrative, he tells Mary
that "in the eye of the world, the misfortunes of your birth stain your
unsullied youth," asking whether she may not "perceive herself, when
too late, the insulted wife of the man she loves"? (69-70). Transfixed by
the letter, Mary hurls it in front of William, and after some discompo
sure vows "to prove myself worthy the confidence of my patron" (74).
William argues strenuously. He angers his father. When Mary
remains adamant, he leaves for London.
Soon after. Sir Peter exacts "retribution," dismissing Neville from
his clerical living.^'' Mary attributes the calamity to her "own error"
(93), giving Neville her legacy from Raymond so he can take a position
abroad. But her sheltered life concludes as Raymond dies, and she

" As Martha Mahoney observes, women's lives intersect the legal system at moments of great
urgency, when remaking social expectations is too large a task." See "Viaimization or
Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency," in Martha Fineman and Roxanne
Mykitiuk, eds.. The Public Nature of Private Violence: the Discovery of Domestic Abuse (New
York: Routledge, 1994), 59-92.
"Sir Peter's"retribution" is his privilege as lord of the manor;a prostitute's"retaliation," equally
motivated by personal animus, is deemed anti-social.
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prepares to work in London. Before she leaves, however, Sir Peter
sends a note, stating that William is engaged to an heiress and that his
father "scrupled not to speak freely among his acquaintance" of Mary's
unhappy birth, his son's "happy escape," and the folly of Mary's
education in light of her "sex...situation, and pretensions" (107).
Shattered by the news of William, stunned that she has not "re
nounced" him (108), Mary departs.
The journey seems almost a piece of luck when a woman on the
coach invites her to a house in London. Mary, credentialled by
Raymond to a family of strangers, accepts. The house is grand and she
is treated cordially, but soon Mary misgives. The situation is suddenly
clarified: Sir Peter enters "with an air of easy familiarity, as if master of
the house." Mary shrinks. He cites her "perverseness and pride" for this
necessary "strategem" (112). She protests—-"You have no authority to
constrain me; I will go this moment" (113)—but her imputation of false
imprisonment is barely acknowledged. She is led away. "A gentle
restraint for a few days," Sir Peter claims, will allow him to urge his
case and secure their "mutual happiness" (113-14).
As her confinement lengthens, Mary tries to escape. On the ninth
day she intoxicates the maid and slips down the stairs. But as she makes
her way...Sir Peter! She tries to shriek, but cannot. After a brief
resistance, she "suffered a brutal violation" (117).
For days, Mary is faint. When Sir Peter forces his way in to see
her, she demands to be set free: "No one has the right to control me. I
will appeal to the tribunal of my country. I will boldly claim the
protection of its laws, to which thou art amenable" (117). In The Victim
of Prejudice, "tribunal" is a freighted term. It denotes the ironic
displacement of law by "injustice," through which class and gender
overdetermine outcomes. Mary's projected "appeal" is doomed.
Speaking as if he were opposing counsel. Sir Peter cooly observes that
events of the past few days have "irretrievably injured your reputa
tion." The servants have been talking, putting "their own construction
on the chance that threw you into my arms, and have already made us
the theme of the neighborhood." Sir Peter is absolved. Chance is
Mary's rapist; her traducers, servants; the crux, her "lamentions for the
consequences of an accident" which "silence might have suppressed"
(118). With brutal irony, he suggests that if she leaves, no one will
employ her. "Such are the stupid prejudices of the world. What is called
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in your sex honour and character, can, I fear, never be restored to you"
(119).
Most particularly, he turns from the vulnerability of her character
to her impotence before the law, citing its brutality: it will further ruin
her reputation, while affording no relief. He postulates the most serious
charge Mary can bring—rape—and urges that it will redound to her
disadvantage:
Who will credit the tale you mean to tell? What testi
mony or witnesses can you produce that will not make
against you? Where are your resources to sustain the vexacions and delay of a suit at law, which you wildly threaten?
Who would support you against my wealth and influence?
How would your delicacy shrink from the idea of becoming,
in open court, the sport of ribaldry, the theme of obscene
jesters? (119)
As Anna Clark points out in her study of sexual assault, the eighteenth
century law was inherently paradoxical: a rapist deserved to be hung
where he attacked female chastity, but a violated (i.e. formerly chaste)
woman lost credibility as a prosecutrix. "Juries hesitated to hang a man
for rape on the testimony of a woman who admitted publicly that she
was unchaste and therefore unworthy. Trials for rape were thus an
evidentiary ordeal: judges "asked the victim to describe in detail how
the rape occurred. Male judges, counsels, juries, and spectators were
obsessed with the explicit sexual details of rape....In part, this curiosity
stemmed from crude prurience; rape victims sometimes faced laughter
from the galleries when they attempted to testify and transcripts of rape
trials were sold as titillating literature" (54). Sir Peter, apparently wellread in such texts, cites them by way of intimidation, using Mary's own
delicacy against her. He also seems to understand what Clark's account
makes clear: "gentlemen could certainly rape poor women with
impunity" (40).
Clark, Women's Silence Men's Violence:Sexual Assault inEngland 1770-184S (London: Pandora
Press, 1987), 47. Between 1770 and 1800, only three out of forty-three rape trials at the Old
Bailey resulted in convictions (two of these for girls of fourteen). See Clark, 58. A London
barrister opined that rape was only "the artless sincerity of natural passion." See Manasseh
Dawes, An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (London, 1782), 85. Sir Peter apparently concurs,
claiming his act was "a temporary effervescence" (117).
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Sir Peter's rebuke prevails on Mary to be silent, to continue
stifling the shriek she could not utter. Rapes of adult women were
rarely prosecuted, since the "victim's honour, no matter how she
struggled, was thought to be irrevocably tarnished. Unlike the usual
practice in eighteenth-century courts, the focus was not on the accused,
but on the victim's character. "A woman bringing a charge and giving
evidence in court opened herself to an investigation into her life, for if
the defense could show she was not of good character, doubt might be
thrown on the accusation....[A]ny doubts raised were often sufficient
to overthrow the charge.'"^ Mary's false imprisonment and rape is
recapitulated by the legal process, which imprisons Mary in the silence
of female "reputation," in her case already ruined but in danger of being
blasted again by public exposure.^® By establishing the correspondence
between crimes by men against women and crimes ("injustice")
perpetrated by the courts. The Victim of Prejudice is Mary's belated
shriek.'' It points to legal inequities that its sister novels finesse. It gives
rape a public character."*® Indeed, in that sense it renovates the most
famous rape in eighteenth-century literature, Clarissa's. As Eleanor Ty
suggests, Clarissa is Hays's intertext; The Victim of Prejudice is in part
"Clarissa from a feminist perspective.'"" Osborne reflects this perspec-

" Clark, Women's Silence, 29. On the failure of women to prosecute, see 50. See also Seattle,
Crime and the Courts in England, 127.
" Seattle, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800,126. Slackstone states that the court will
consider whether the victim "be of evil fame, and standsunsupported by others." Commentaries,
213.
" In "The Advertisement to the Reader," Hays cites "the too-great stress laid on the reputation
for chastity in women" (1). It becomes a means of enforcing silence, exiling women from legal
redress. Sir Peter's warning resonates with Catharine MacKinnon's observation that "women
who charge rape say they were raped twice, the second time in court." Toward a Feminist Theory
of the State, 179.
" Hays seems aware that it was "taken to be a weakness" in a rape accusation "if during the
attack [the woman] made no attempt to cry out for help." Beattie, Crime and the Courts in
England 1660-1800, 126. She may have read Blackstone, who states that it is material "where it
was possible [a woman] might have been heard, and she made no outcry." See Commentaries,
214.
" Blackstone is so skittish about going "pubhc" with the incidents of rape, that he skips this
aspect of the subject: "As to the material faas requisite to be given in evidence and proved upon
an indictment of rape, they are of such a nature.,.[that] they are highly improper to be publicly
discussed, except in a court of justice." Commentaries, 213.
•" "Introduction," The Victim of Prejudice, xxii.
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tive ironically. His taunt bespeaks the banality of rape, the evil of its
everydayness."*^
Yet Mary refuses to accept his admonition: "My honour, you say,
can never he restored to me? Oh, 'tis false! (119). Osborne feigns her
liberation, "whispering to his servant as [Mary] ran... into the street"
(120). In the eighteenth century, the "street" harbored menace. Urban
reformers "could not impose their will or standards of behaviour
on...the impoverished denizens of rookeries, common lodging houses
and unfurnished rooms—in short, the mob that made up a large
proportion of a Georgian city. The streets were ungovernable.'"*' Mary
is cast into the world of her mother. She walks "through many streets
and turnings, unconscious to the passing objects, unknowing whither
I went, careless of the future, without lodging, without plan or
purpose, friendless and unknown" (121). Her displacement from the
middle-class into an irregular economy is signified by aimless walking.
Michel de Certeau notes that "to walk is to lack a place. It is the
indefinite process of being absent and in search of a proper place.'"*'*
Mary's fall, her loss of reputation and economic security, reified in her
pointless urban walking, signifies an absence from normative modes
entitling women to deference.'*'
On the brink of delirium, Mary miraculouslyencounters William,
who installs her in a hotel and nurses her. In "intervals of reflection,"
she has "dark and dreadful" visions of her mother:

" Sir Peter's displacement of guilt onto chance, the servants, Mary herself, supponed by the
law's complicity, reflects a"process of legitimation," in which "the law, through non-interference
as well as positive acts, creates a private 'space' within which the strong can dominate the weak
free of the threat of state or community intervention...See Robin West, "Invisible Viaims;
A Comparison of Susan Glaspell's Jury of Her Peers, and Herman Melville's Bartlehy the
Scrivener," Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 8 (1996): 203-47, 205. Legal complicity in
constructing a "consciousness of privilege and deprivation," "renderfs]such suffering invisible"
(236). MacKinnon says more bluntly: "The state has laws against sexual assault but it does not
enforce them. Like lynching at one time, rape is socially permitted, though formally illegal."
Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, 245.
•" Dan Cruickshank and Neil Burton, Life in the Georgian City (New York: Viking, 1990), 17.
Colquhoun's Treatise anatomized the menace.
" The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 103.
Compare Jemima's wandering prior to being comimtted tothe workhouse:"I wasturned loose
in the street, pennyless. I wandered from street to street, till, exhausted by hunger and fatigue,
I sunk down senseless at a door, where I had vainly demanded a morsel of bread." The Wrongs
of Women, 118.
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I saw her haggard, intoxicated, self-abandoned...and, in
an instant, as the fantastic scene shifted, covered with blood,
accused of murder, shrieking in horrible despair, dragged to
the scaffold, sinking beneath the hand of the executioner.

Absent from Mary's vision is the trial, evincing the foregone conclu
sion of her mother's fate, reproduced in Mary's own position relative
to the law: as one who like her mother is declasse, she can expect no
legal accommodation. In the vision, her mother "seemed to urge me to
take example from her fate!" (123). The correspondence between Mary
and her mother deepens when "William reveals his marriage. He claims
the match is pecuniary, that he still adores her, but Mary refuses to
become his mistress. He sums up her fate in legal metaphor, signifying
again the continuity between patriarchal and legal institutions:
[S]ociety would, with inexorable malignity, hunt me
from its privileges; that, with a mind peerless and unstained,
I should yet suffer all the penalties of guilt, without possible
appeal or redress. (128)
William's admonition resonates with Sir Peter's.
The next morning, Mary quits the hotel to meet her potential
employer. Suspicious of the long delay, the woman questions her
minutely. Has Mary sought legal redress for the insult and detention
she avers? The question betrays aloofness. Mary cites indigence, lack of
"friends and counsel" in extenuation (133). Who was the gentleman
who helped her? Mary whispers William's name. After a while, she
departs, abashed, awaiting the outcome of further inquiries. She boards
at a rooming house, obtaining credit to replace some articles left at Sir
Peter's.
Soon she receives a note from the woman, recounting her
application to William's father to corroborate Mary's story. His father,
it seems, conveyed talk linking Mary to Osborne; claimed that Mary
seduced William after his marriage; took Raymond's name though no
relation; was educated out of charity. He offered such information
"solely from motives of justice," to prevent Mary's entry into an
innocent, respectable family. Hysterical at the injustice, Mary tries to
counter such "cruel calumnies" (135), but the damage is done. As
William predicted, she suffers "the penalties of guilt, without possible
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appeal or redress." Again, social incidents imply a legal counterpart:
paternal animus (like patriarchal "retribution") cannot be redressed.
Under eighteenth-century defamation law, imputation of unfitness for
a profession was ptmishable by damages. However, one had to have "a
definite calling recognized by the law [clergyman, attorney, justice of
the peace, physician, etc.], and not merely a temporary employment,
or an employment of a menial nature.'"*^ It would have been impossible
for a lower class woman to sue for defamation: she could have no
profession. Mary's suitability as ladies' maid or governess is beneath the
law's concern.
Mary pursues other positions, but is dogged by rumor. After three
days coloring botanical prints, she spies Osborne's valet skulking about;
the next day her employer demands sexual favors."*^ She looks for
servant jobs, but can produce no "character." When she finally locates
a position, her prospective employer receives a note (apparently from
Osborne) impugning her, costing her the place. Returning to her
lodgings, she is arrested for debt at the suit of her landlady, to whom
she owes twenty pounds.
Sir Peter is trying to force Mary into complaisance. Before she is
actually removed to jail, he offers to bail her, even to satisfy the debt:
Was that beauteous frame formed to endure the squalid
miseries of famine and destitution? to mix in the loathsome
gaol with the refuse of mankind? to herd with robbers,
prostitutes, and felons? to perish with want, with contagion,
with consuming grief, or devouring anguish? (150)

" Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 8:349. Moreover, as the judges "were experts in [the]
an of critically examining words, it was not difficult to find a non-defamatory sense in the most
insulting words" (356).
" The demand is sexual harassment avant la lettre. It differs from that routinely suffered by
servants in that Mary is not a "familiar,"grown close to her employer under thesame roof. Hays
seeks todefine (and publicize) a distinct class of injury unrecognized in law, largely unrecognized
in literature. She also seeks to compHcate stereotypes, such as Colquhoun's, that the poor "lack
industry," demonstrating that (women's) work is contingent on sexual complaisance. Insofar as
Hays seeks to define the social aspect of women's private experience, showing that such
experience originates in women's subordinate social status, she anticipates modern theorization
of the sexuality/employment nexus. See Catharine MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working
Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).
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Mary refuses, and is led away. No sooner is she incarcerated, however,
than she is discovered by James, Raymond's old servant. Inquiring as
to her crime, Mary responds:
The crime,James, of owing twenty pounds for food and
lodging.—Robbed of the little property bequeathed to me by
our beloved patron, unable to procure honest employment,
compelled tosupport a wretched being, I was obliged to incur
a debt which I am utterly incapable of repaying. (154)
While her "crime" seems banal, the everyday story of the London poor,
her imprisonment for debt—not vagrancy—is a radical revision of
gothicized, genteel versions of woman's "fall." More particularly, it
"feminizes" discourse clamoring to abolish imprisonment for debt. In
the eighteenth century, debtors might stay in jail forever if unable to
post bail and, ultimately, satisfy the debt."*® The movement to abolish
this "remedy" argued that even felons had their day in court, while
debtors were at the mercy of creditors, whom the state unconstitution
ally abetted with miserable jails.'" The argument, presented with legal
rigor and heart-rending passion, was without exception applied to the
paterfamilias down on his luck.
The Society for the Discharge and Relief of Persons Imprisoned
for Small Debts, states: "If the poor Manufacturer or Labourer, whose
industrious hands provide his wife and numerous offspring with
necessary bread, be shut up in prison, and withheld from labour, his
wife and children must unavoidably become a heavy parochial
incumbrance" {Account, 13). Reporting on aid it has distributed, the
Society notes: "The number of debtors discharged and relieved within

On the law relating to imprisonment for debt, as well as the theory behind it, seeJ oanna Innes,
"The King's Bench Prison in the Later Eighteenth Century; Law, Authority and Order in a
London Debtors' Prison," in John Brewer and John Styles, eds.. An Ungovernable People: The
English and Their Law in the Sevententhand Eighteenth Centuries (London: Hutchinson, 1980),
250-98. For contemporary, critical accounts of the law's evolution see T. Delamayne, The Rise
and Practice of Imprisonment in Personal Actions Examined (London, 1772), and Thomas
Macdonald, A Treatise on Civil Imprisonment in England (London, 1791).
•" See Macdonald, A Treatise on Civil Imprisonment; New,Candid, and Practical Thoughts on the
Law of Imprisonment for Deht...By a Country Attorney (London, 17ZZ); An Account of the Rise,
Progress, and Present State,ofthe Societyfor the Discharge and Reli^ofPersons ImprisonedforSmall
Debts, 14th ed. (London, 1799); Edward Farley, Imprisonment for Debt Unconstitutional and
Oppressive (London, 1788).
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twelve months...amounted to 578, who had 272 wives, and 738
children" (53). It claimed that women were eligible for aid, but that
"such debtors shall have the preference, as...have the largest families
unprovided for" (62). With the most charitable motives, the Society
could not envision a single woman such as Mary, "unable to procure
honest employment," beset by a loss of "character" through no fault of
her own.
Other tracts were similarly androcentric. Jean Prujean argued that
by abolishing debtor imprisonment, "thousands would be thereby
enabled to provide for and take care of their families."^® Considerations
on the Laws Between Debtors and Creditors (1789) lamented the debtor's
despair, "his wife and his children shut out of his sight" (25). Even
Maria Barrell's sentimental drama. The Captive (1790), depicts a male
debtor; the creditor demands his wife's favors in exchange for remission
of the debt." There was such silence regarding women jailed for debt,
that the author of New, Candid, and Practical Thoughts stated:
There are many cruel hardships and pernicious evils
which persons confined for debt suffer, and are exposed to,
and are of the most affecting kind in the case of women, of
which it is much to be wished that a real treatment could be
laid before the Legislature. That statement is not, however,
to be expected just, candid, and impartial from PrisonKeepers or Law-Men. (34-35)
The Victim of Prejudice challenges this silence, offering an alternative
narrative of women's "fall" into prison. It looks beyond financial
reverse or physical calamity—extenuations offered on behalf of
men—demonstrating that women's indebtedness results from a system
opposed to their independence. The text is "political," therefore, not
just because it disrupts prevailing ideology, but because it intervenes in
a radical (but male-oriented) campaign, confronting issues that have
been suppressed."
Treatise Upon the Laws of England Now in Force Forthe Recovery of Debt (London, 1791), 21.
In her Preface to The Captive, Barrell cites the conventional argument: "Alas! where is the
utility of inhumation, depriving society of its useful members, and filling our miserable
receptuals of wretched penury, with the wives and children of the unhappy insolvent" (ix).
The campaign was indeed "radical," informed by the revolutionary temper of the 90s. See
Innes, "The King's BenchPrisoninthe Later EighteenthCentury," noting: "Parliament shunned
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Mary is not, however, long in jail. James bails her with a small
legacy from Raymond: "[T]he law...the law shall not have my kind old
master's darling for twenty pounds" (154). Unfortunately, the transac
tion requires him to give Osborne's steward a bond, since he has leased
a small farm on the manor. Mary is concerned: "the money he had
advanced for my release would, I had but too much reason to fear,
incapacitate him from fulfilling his engagements" (157). But James
invites her to join him, and with hopes of a fair harvest, they set out.
The harvest falters, however (as it does for real in 1799), and with some
difficulty Mary borrows funds from a neighbor. Shortly thereafter,
owing to Osborne, Mary finds herself insulted, sneered at. The
neighbor begins to importtme for the debt, suggesting "with gross hints
and coarse language...that an equivalent might be accepted" (163).
The noose tightens more. Aging, infirm, James is unable to keep
up the farm. He dies. The steward takes possession of furniture and
implements "for arrears of rent and payment of the bond given in
default of the original contract." Finally, at the prospect of Mary's utter
ruin, Osborne is moved. "With apparent sincerity," he offers marriage
(164). She is indignant, refusing as well his offer to serve as her banker.
The next day he leaves for a foreign tour, Mary discovers his gift of a
fifty pound note, and sends it after him.
News of the note, however, precedes Mary to the next town,
owing to a servant's chatter. No sooner does she set out than a rider
overtakes her with the neighbor's writ. Unable to discharge it, she is
"hurried back, and thrown into the county-gaol, overwhelmed with
obloquy and disgrace" (167).
Mary's incarceration becomes an instance of sexual politics: "My
incensed creditor resolved to revenge himself for my former disdain,
and, at least, to detain me in confinement till the return of the 'squire,
who, from the past transactions, he doubted not would cheerfully
liberate me" (167). As contemporary tracts point out, revenge, as well
as manipulation of the debtor's imprisonment for private motives, was
a common practice." Hays transposes such complaints into gendered
radical interference with the sacred corpus of English law....Far from being a period of great
reform in the debt laws, the late eighteenth century saw a stern pro-creditor reaction" (260).
" In A Treatise on Civil Imprisonment in England, Macdonald notes: "It is put in the power of
the creditor, without assigning a reason, to step in between the pubhc and his debtor; still to
insist upon the confinement of the poor prisoner's body, for the satisfaction of his own malice
and caprice, or the accomplishment of some secret and unjustifiable purpose" (109). Inyd Treatise
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discourse. Mary's imprisonment becomes aversion of her confinement
in Osborne's house: in each case, thwarted male desire underlies a
woman's immobilization. The text depicts legal process be perceived in
alliance with patriarchal practice, illuminating dark sexual undercur
rents absent from standard legal discourse.
Mary describes her months in Jail in terms resonating with
demands for prison reform, which cited the mental and physical decay
of inmates:
[T]he damp and unwholesome air of my apartment has
communicated rheumatic pains to my limbs; the vigour of
my frame begins to yield to the depredations of grief, the
inactivity of my situation, and the mephitic vapour that
surrounds me...
A deadly torpor steals over my faculties; principles
loosen in my clouded mind...; the current of life creeps
slowly, wasted by inanity and clogged by disease.^'' (168)

upon the Laws of England,Prujean asks who could ever have imagined that the laws relating to
debt would become "Instruments of Revenge" (L). An Account of the Rise, Progress, and Present
State...states that "sometimes, malice or revenge may be the only motive of the Creditor to arrest
his Debtor" (11).
"In The State ofthe Prisons in England and Wales,3rd. ed. (London, 1784),John Howard noted
that "Many [prisoners] who went in healthy, are in a few months changed to emaciated objects"
(3). He cited "want of food...in many county gaols," remarking that "some debtors are the most
pitiable objeas" (5). He went on to observe that "many prisons have no Watef (6), that there
was a nauseous "effluvia from the sick," and that "some gaols have no Sewers or vaults" (7). In
particular, he cited "gaol fever" (8), a type of typhus that was at times epidemic in jails. Citing
the same conditions, see John Mason Good, A Dissertation on the Diseases of Prisons and Poor
Houses, Published at the Request of the Medical Society of London (London, 1795). Good also
enumerates "DEPRESSION OF SPIRITS," stating that "it is not to be wondered at, that this
should become a cause of disease, and more especially of the low nervous fever" (80). Reformers
had to contend with an attitude described by Sean McConville, who observe that "In the 1790's,
to many people the close air and squalid condition of a prison were considered as 'its necessary
attributes, and even men of respectable judgement have supposed, in the case of Debtors, that
the filth of the Prison, SQUALOR CARCERIS, was a proper means of compelling them to do
justice to their Creditors.'The financial and legal communities, although occasionally perplexed
by a conflict in values, continued to believe that debtors should literally rot in prison." See A
History of English Prison Administration (London: Routledge, 1981), 1:61. On the nonenforcement of prison reforms during the period,see Beatrice and Sidney Webb, English Prisons
Under Local Government (New York: Longmans, 1922). See generally Randall McGowan, "The
Well-Ordered Prison: England, 1780-1865," in Norvall Morris and David Rothman, eds.. The
Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995), 79-110.
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Unlike her mother, who would have hanged within three days of
conviction under the Murder Act, Mary dies slowly." Prison does not
concentrate her mind; it dissipates it. Loss of self, rather than a sudden
access of voice, becomes Mary's governing trope. She disappears,
emerging inpotentia only as text: "Ihave lived in vain\ unless the story
of my sorrows should kindle in the heart of man, in behalf of my
oppressed sex, the sacred claims of humanity and justice" (174) Mary's
narrative is a cenotaph. Her text ends with absence, consistent with the
androcentric legal discourse that excludes her "oppressed sex." Mary
can break through such exclusion only insofar as her text is read.
As Mary's text buckles under the weight of patriarchy, it points
to the weakness of late eighteenth-century feminist discourse. As a selfproclaimed "victim," indeed one whose voice may remain unheard,
Mary rejects the essential assumption of gender activism: the irrepress
ible agency of woman.^'' In this regard. The Victim of Prejudice interro
gates the leading feminist text of the 1790s, Wollstonecraft's A
Vindication of the Rights of Woman, which asserts it is "time to restore
to [women] their lost dignity—and make them, as a part of the human
species, labour by reforming themselves to reform the world."^^ Mary's
defeat, encompassed in narrative fiction, uses fiction to test theory: in
the streets of real life, theory is fiction. Beginning from this assump
tion, The Victim of Prejudice offers a feminism paradoxically even more
"theoretical" than Wollstonecraft's, virtually denying feminism as a
possibility except insofar as it can generate texts.

On the Murder Act, 25 Geo.n, c.37 (1752), see Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal
taw 1,206-9. Reformers commonly observed that death resulted from imprisonment for debt.
In The Captive, the debtor's wife cries: "Is insolvency so great a crime that a man must die
?"
(19).
As Mahoney points out, "agency and victimization are understood in relation to each other:
agency is exercised by a self-determining individual, one who is not victimized by others." See
"Victimization or Oppression," 60.
A Vindication of the Rights of Woman (1792), 135. Mary Poovey notes that Wollstonecraft
never escaped "the myth of personal autonomy," failing to see that an "individual's opportuni
ties" are in "important respects, delimited by one's place in the culture." TheProper Lady and the
Woman Writer;Ideology as Stylein the Works ofMary Wollstonecraft,Mary shelley,andJane Austen
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 109. Hannah More, who opposed what she
considered Wollstonecraft's extremism, nonetheless advocated a female agency consistent with
Evangelicalism. As Mitzi Myers points out, "both preach a militantly moral middle-class reform
grounded in women's potentiality." "Ruin or Reform: 'A Revolution in Female Manners,'
Studies in Eighteenth-Century Culture 11 (1982), 199-216.
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As Robin West points out, in a context of twentieth-centuty
feminism expounding "self-possession, awareness, autonomy," "it is
now fiction..x\i3X. can most strikingly remind us of the presence of real
victims...suffering serious but invisible injury."'' Hays participates in
the same phenomenon, rewriting the text of feminism in a weak
hand—Mary's. Mary fears that her text, like her suffering, will be
"invisible," throwing into relief the silencing, legitimating discourses of
law.

' "Invisible Victims," 245.

